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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah
corporation, SHARRON KILLION
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN,
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons
unknown, claiming any right,
title, estate or interest in, or
lien upon the real property
described in - the pleading adverse
to the plaintiff's ownership, or
clouding its title thereto,

Case No. 950705-CA

Priority (15)

Defendants and Appellees.
Plaintiff replies to the Brief of Appellees, Wilford H.
Hansen Stone Quarries, Inc., a Utah corporation

(hereinafter

referred to as "Stone Quarries" or "Corporate defendant") and
Sharron

Killion

(hereinafter

referred

to

as

"Killion")

(the

defendants, James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen are
hereinafter referred to as "Jensens"), as follows, to-wit:
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.

PLAINTIFF CORPORATION RETAINS ITS CORPORATE

EXISTENCE AND POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTING AND DISPOSING OF
ITS ASSETS

WITHOUT

TIME

LIMITATION, AND

THE ASSETS

DO NOT

AUTOMATICALLY PASS TO THE SHAREHOLDERS BY OPERATION OF LAW AT
DISSOLUTION.
The first argument of Stone Quarries and Killion seems to
be that dissolution of plaintiff passed title automatically to its

shareholders at dissolution, thus going beyond even what defendants
Jensen argue.
Plaintiff
dissolved,

argues

that

plaintiff

has

not

yet

been

but that even if it has been, the title to the assets

of the dissolved corporation remain in the corporation.

This

entire subject is dealt with at length in plaintiff's original
brief and brief in Reply to the brief of Jensens, and those
arguments are adopted at this point.
Stone Quarries and Killion do raise one new item.

They

seem to be concerned that such a conveyance by operation of law
does not violate the statute of frauds.
issue.

We think this is a non-

The Utah statute of frauds is after all a statute.

A

number of limitations or exceptions are already expressly spelled
out in the statute.

If Utah wanted to create another exception

thereto by a statute declaring that upon dissolution the assets of
a corporation pass by operation of law to its shareholders, it
could no doubt do so, even if it created a "mess."

Such a statute

would simply be another exception to the statute of frauds.
The point is however that Utah has not done so.

In fact

Utah has done just the opposite. By statute the assets do not pass
to the shareholders, and therefore there is no statute of frauds
issue here.
Stone Quarries and Killion in their Statement of Facts
(at page 7 of their brief) note that plaintiff's Articles of
Dissolution stated that the property and assets of plaintiff "have
been distributed among its shareholders," and concludes therefrom
-2-

that the shareholders "received the property."

It is undisputed

that the subject mining claims were never in fact transferred by
the corporation to the shareholders. The defendants argue that the
shareholders got title by operation of law, but no one claims that
the corporation itself deeded the subject mining claims to its
shareholders. The subject mining claims were obviously overlooked,
and there was never any conveyance of the subject mining claims out
of the corporation, and the aforesaid corporate statement was
therefore erroneous.

The statement was made by officers of the

company. It is not contractual. There is no acknowledgment by the
shareholders

that they received

the property.

Even

if the

shareholders had in fact receipted for the property, it is always
permissible to go behind

a receipt or an acknowledgment of

consideration to show lack of consideration or failure to receive
that which is shown in the receipt.
656 P2d 454 (Utah 1982).

See

Nielsen v. MFT Leasing,

The subject mining claims were not

conveyed by plaintiff to its shareholders.
Furthermore, there is no allegation that Stone Quarries
and Killion relied upon any such corporate statement or that they
even knew about it.

At page 11 of their brief defendants, Stone

Quarries and Killion assert that they purchased the subject mining
claims from

"a 'new' Salt Lake Investment Company on March 7,

1990, based on the assumption that the 'old7 Salt Lake Investment
Company

(plaintiff) was dissolved."

That assertion carefully

avoids the use of the work "reliance."
-3-

It uses "assumption"

instead.

In addition, the said assertion makes no sense.

and "old" in and of themselves make no difference.
question is who holds title.

The only

Just because the old corporation is

dissolved doesn't give the new one title.
between the two corporations.

"New"

There is no connection

If Stone Quarries and Killion are

relying upon the shareholders owning the assets, why do they go to
any corporation new or old to seek title?

If Stone Quarries and

Killion thought that the shareholders owned the property, why would
they pay $12,000 to a corporation for a deed.

Stone Quarries and

Killion argue that assets pass to shareholders immediately upon
dissolution.

If this were so, or even if they believed it to be

so, why were they willing to pay a corporation - any corporation anything, let alone $12,000 for quit claim deeds (especially when
the corporation is a total stranger to title) . The fact that Stone
Quarries and Killion sought title from a corporation, demolishes
any claim that Stone Quarries and Killion in any way relied upon
title being vested in any shareholders.

It must be obvious that

there was no reliance upon any corporate statement that assets had
been distributed to shareholders. Furthermore, dissolution or lack
of it can in law have nothing to do with Stone Quarries and Killion
approaching the new corporation, because "reliance" must in any
case be reasonable, and they have shown no grounds upon which a
reasonable person would suppose that he or she could acquire title
from a corporation that is a total stranger to the title. How can
there be reasonable reliance in such conduct?
-4-

There was no reliance. This was a scheme to "appear" to
obtain title.

In order to get the property in the name of Killion

of record, Stone Quarries and Killion had to have a deed from a
grantor with the name of "Salt Lake Investment Company."

They

correctly assumed that the county recorder upon receiving a deed
from a grantor with the name of Salt Lake Investment Company would
not question whether it was the original Salt Lake Investment
Company or another corporation with the same name.
illegal?

Is this fraud?

Is this

Defendants Stone Quarries and Killion at

page 8 of their brief accuse plaintiff of "bad faith" for bringing
this action.

We submit that this action involves legitimate

issues, which any attorney would be entitle to present to a court
of law.

We wonder if tricking the county recorder and attempting

to trick plaintiff out of its assets isn't however bad faith.
Let's view it in terms of a hypothetical using fictitious
names.

Let us assume that a man named John Smith owns Blackacre.

Let us assume that another man named John Smith, who does not own
Blackacre, nevertheless makes out a quit claim deed to Blackacre
naming Harry Jones as grantee for a consideration of $12,000, and
Harry Jones knows that his grantor is a different person from the
one that owns Blackacre.

Nevertheless, Harry Jones has paid some

really big money to get this spurious deed, so he intends to use
it, and he presents the deed to the county recorder.

He does not

tell the recorder that the grantor is a stranger to the title. He
hands the deed to the recorder in the hope that the recorder will
-5-

assume that the John Smith, who appears as owner, and the John
Smith on the quit claim deed are the same person.

If the recorder

knew otherwise, he or she would not knowingly accept the deed, or
at least would not change the ownership records to show Harry Jones
as owner based on this spurious deed.
Once again is there fraud involved here?

If Harry Jones

did not know there were two John Smiths, then there would be no
fraud, but the deed would still be invalid. If however he knew the
true facts is it fraud?
Well, we don't need to answer that because the deed is
invalid either way, and that is really all that matters.

Stone

Quarries and Killion acquired title from a totally different Salt
Lake Investment Company, one that had no connection with plaintiff,
and did not in any way succeed to the assets of the first one. It
was only used by Stone Quarries and Killion to take advantage of
the coincidence in the names.

The second Salt Lake Investment

Company never owned any interest in the subject mining claims.
Perhaps what Stone Quarries and Killion did, may be determined to
be fraudulent.

But whether it is or not, and whether Stone

Quarries and Killion knew the true facts or not, is all irrelevant
on this issue. They could not and did not get a good title from a
grantor who did not have any title to give.
The lower court never got to the merits of this case, and
plaintiff should have its day in court with regard to all of these
issues.
-6-

POINT 2.

PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO SUE TO DEFEND ITS

ASSETS.
The second point of defendants, Stone Quarries and
Killion, is that plaintiff lacks standing to sue or be sued.

We

have dealt with this in our original brief and in our Reply to the
brief of Jensens, and those arguments are adopted at this point.
POINT 3. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES ARE
NOT INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION.
Even if they existed, equitable defenses will not be
accorded to those who lack clean hands. Plaintiff is entitled to
its day in court on the issue of the clean hands of defendants.
Plaintiff claims that Jensens obtained quitclaim deeds by fraud and
claims that Stone Quarries and Killion likewise obtained deeds by
means that are morally tainted, if not outright fraudulent and
illegal.

The claimed equitable defenses are not available.

The

alleged legal and equitable defenses are also not available for
additional reasons:
1.

ESTOPPEL

Estoppel is not an issue.

Plaintiff claims that Stone

Quarries and Killion had a careful title search done, and that they
knew the true facts as to which Salt Lake Investment Company owned
the title, and that they made the deliberate choice to acquire
deeds from a Salt Lake Investment Company which did not own even a
vestige of title and never did own such. There was no reliance on
anything done by plaintiff.

In fact no one would have known what
-7-

Stone Quarries and Killion had done, if Jensens had not obtained
the fraudulent quit claim deeds from plaintiff's shareholders.
When Jensens obtained those deeds, Stone Quarries and Killion's
felt they needed to approach plaintiff and in so doing had to
disclose the

fact that plaintiff

still owned the tracts in

question.
2.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LACHES.

Statute of

limitations and laches are not involved in this action.

Jensens

did not even purportedly acquire any interest in the subject
property until October, 1993, when the fraudulent quit claim deeds
were obtained.

We believe that even the three years statute of

limitations for fraud has been tolled by the filing of this action,
but even if that were not so, the three years has still not
elapsed.
Defendants Stone Quarries and Killion claim under a quit
claim deed acquired in 1990. As we have seen these deeds are from
a Salt Lake Investment Company which was a complete stranger to
title, and Stone Quarries and Killion cannot claim anything under
this spurious deed no matter how many years elapse.
Stone Quarries and Killion
possession.

also assert a claim

Defendants
for

adverse

No specifics are alleged, but presumably this claim

runs from 1990 as well.

Seven years adverse possession are

necessary and only five years have elapsed from their appearance on
the scene to the commencement of this action, so no statute has yet
run

which

bars

plaintiff's

defense
-8-

to

a

claim

of

adverse

possession.
There are numerous hurdles to claiming title by adverse
possession. The possession must be open, notorious and adverse for
7 years without interruption.

During that entire time, the taxes

must be paid without interruption. Finally the possession for all
7 years must meet the requirements of Section 78-12-11 UCA, if the
claim is not under color of title, or it must meet the requirements
of Section 78-12-9 UCA if the claim is under color of title.

A

spurious deed is not color of title, but in any event this action
was commenced within 7 years after any of the deeds were obtained,
so there is not going to be any adverse possession under color of
title in this action. The burden of proving possession under color
of title is much easier because it appears that one only has to
prove that the property was used for the "ordinary use of the
occupant" for 7 years without interruption.

Without color of

title, the burden is difficult indeed, and requires a "substantial
enclosure" for 7 years without interruption, or that the land be
"cultivated or improved" for 7 years without interruption, or that
irrigation expenditures of at least $5.00 per acre be shown for 7
years without interruption. We believe that no defendant can show
any such possession.

In any event, plaintiff is entitled to its

day in court on all of these issues, and the court cannot rule that
plaintiff cannot recover under any facts which it may be able to
prove.

See Russell v. Park City Utah Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 184,

506 P.2d 1274 (1973).
-9-

Even assuming that plaintiff was dissolved 30 years ago,
that 30 years period is another non-issue and is nothing but a red
herring.

Let us illustrate.
Assume that John Doe bought a vacant lot 35 years ago

thinking that he would some day build a barn on it.
years

later survived

by two sons.

proceedings for heirship.

He died 5

There is no probate or

Quit claim deeds (whether valid or

invalid) relating to this property are acquired by third parties in
1990 and 1993 respectively.

Does the fact that John Doe and his

estate/heirs owned the property for 35 years (30 of it since his
death) have any bearing on the validity of the quit claim deeds or
on the validity of a claim for adverse possession?

The length of

time John Doe or his sons have owned the property is irrelevant.
It could be 10 years, 30 years or 60 years.
Now when "John Doe" is a dissolved corporation owning an
undistributed piece of property for let us say 5 years before the
corporation is dissolved and for 30 years after dissolution, how
does that change the situation?

Whether the corporation owns its

assets (as plaintiff claims) or whether the shareholders own the
assets by operation of law, in either case, the lapse of time
creates no more defenses for the quit claim deed claimants where
the owners are persons than where a corporation is involved.
The only time period which concerns the court is the
time period beginning with the time plaintiff's title comes under
attack from defendants, which is 1990 and 1993 and the years
-10-

following, and the 30 year period is irrelevant. Plaintiff had no
duty to sue defendants or anyone else until plaintiff's title was
attacked.
Where titles are concerned, a long period of time of 30
or more years in and of itself means nothing.

If we suppose that

defendants had legitimately started to adverse plaintiff's title
beginning 30 years ago, but "slept on their rights" and never got
around to quieting title, would anyone say that because "records
have certainly been lost [and] memories faded" that defendants
cannot go back 30 years with their proof?

We think not.

Even if the claim of adverse possession of defendants
Stone Quarries and Killion runs for some years before 1990, unless
it was completed by then,

Stone Quarries and Killion will not be

able to use the years since 1990 as part of the required 7 years
period, because while they are claiming under the owner (even if
falsely

so

claiming)

adversely to it.

they

cannot by

definition

be

claiming

If they are claiming under the owner (even

falsely) they cannot be claiming adversely to the owner.
the years they have attempted

by trickery

During

to appear to be

successors to and in privity with the true owner, they cannot claim
adversely as well.

However that may be, it is an issue which

remains to be tried, and which clearly forecloses summary judgment.
Defendants

Stone

Quarries

and

Killion

claim

that

plaintiff "slumbered" on its rights and is subject to the defense
of laches as a matter of law.

They claim that plaintiff delayed
-11-

bring this suit to the prejudice of defendants. Plaintiff did not
know it had a claim until just before this suit was filed.

The

fact that it still owned the subject claims was brought to the
attention of plaintiff when it was contacted by Stone Quarries and
Killion shortly before this action was commenced.

One cannot

slumber on unknown rights. At the very least its knowledge is an
issue of fact.
matter.

Plaintiff did not knowingly procrastinate in this

When it was advised of the true facts, this action was

promptly commenced.

Furthermore, no one was injured or misled by

any inaction of plaintiff.

Stone Quarries and Killion claim from

1990, and this suit was commenced within the 7 year period for
adverse possession following 1990. Jensens only claim from 1993,
and this action was commenced within about 18 months of their
appearance on the scene. There has been no intentional or knowing
delay, and there has been no showing of prejudice whatever.
The fact is that all defendants knew the true facts long
before plaintiff, and all attempted to take advantage of that
knowledge to defraud plaintiff, and this should not be permitted.
It is clear that there is no legitimate issue of statute of
limitations or laches in this case.
Plaintiff is entitled to its day in court on the validity
of the quit claim deeds and on the validity of the claim of adverse
possession.
Stone Quarries and Killion at page 6 of their brief state
that the lower court "reviewed legal and equitable defenses"
-12-

against

plaintiff.

The

court

did

discuss

the

statutes of

limitation, but did not discuss laches or estoppel.

The court

discussed statutes of limitation in the light of "winding up." The
court said "Nearly every single statue of limitations would have
run in such a time [30 years]..."

Plaintiff's assert that winding

up has no time limitation, and if we are correct in that it
disposes of this issue in any event.

Nevertheless, as we have

noted, the court erroneously considered the statutes of limitation
in the light of the 30 years since the alleged dissolution.

It

erroneously assumed that all statues of limitation which could be
relevant to this law suit had to commence 30 years ago. As we have
shown this is of course not the case. Statutes of limitation must
be viewed in the light of the time of the attack against the title
of plaintiff. Applicable statutes of limitation had not run as of
the time of the commencement of this action.
Stone Quarries and Killion also state at page 6 of their
brief, that:

"Permitting Salt Lake Investment Company to go

forward would result in costly litigation which would likely
produce a similar outcome." (Emphasis added.)

"Likely" may be the

test for a preliminary injunction, but it is not the test for a
summary judgment.

To sustain a summary judgment, the court's job

is not to determine what the "likely" outcome will be.

It must

determine as a matter of law that there are no facts - no fact
situation - under which plaintiff could recover.
Park City Utah Corporation, supra.
-13-

See Russell v.

The facts have never been

developed

in this case, so it certainly cannot be said that

plaintiff cannot recover under any facts which it may be able to
prove within the pleadings, and this case should be returned to the
lower court for complete discovery and trial.
We urge the court to discard the non-issues which have
been

raised

in

order

to

shield

defendants

from

their

own

wrongdoing, and to allow this matter to be tried on the merits
without delay.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment of the
District Court should be reversed, and this action remanded for
trial on all issues and as to all parties.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant respectfully requests oral argument of this
appeal.
Dated this

day of July, 1996.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
and Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants
were mailed to each of the following at the address shown, postage
prepaid, the

day of July, 1996:
Derek Langton
Attorney for Defendants Jensen
201 South Main, Suite 1800
P. 0. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr.
Attorney for the Corporate Defendant and Killion,
Mountain Fuel East Professional Plaza
1172 East Highway 6, Suite 7
P. O. Box 67
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Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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